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ABSTRACT
Ranking algorithms play a crucial role in online platforms ranging
from search engines to recommender systems. In this paper, we
identify a surprising consequence of popularity-based rankings: the
fewer the items reporting a given signal, the higher the share of the
overall traffic they collectively attract. This few-get-richer effect
emerges in settings where there are few distinct classes of items
(e.g., left-leaning news sources versus right-leaning news sources),
and items are ranked based on their popularity. We demonstrate
analytically that the few-get-richer effect emergeswhen people tend
to click on top-ranked items and have heterogeneous preferences
for the classes of items. Using simulations, we analyze how the
strength of the effect changes with assumptions about the setting
and human behavior. We also test our predictions experimentally in
an online experiment with human participants. Our findings have
important implications to understand the spread of misinformation.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Ranking systems are at the core of many online services, includ-
ing search engines, recommender systems, or news feeds in social
media. Recent research suggests that the underlying ranking al-
gorithms may impact society, playing an active role in the spread
of misinformation [29], political polarization [11], or trustworthi-
ness [14]. They might also reinforce existing judgment biases [2].
Rankings systematically affect the information people access
about products, services, events, or ideas, because users are more
likely to click on top-ranked items [19, 24, 30]. When items are
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ranked based on popularity, this leads to a self-reinforcing dynam-
ics according to which popular items become increasingly more
popular [28].
In this paper, we identify a surprising effect of popularity-based
rankings. Consider a setting with two distinct classes of news
sources that differ in their political orientations, e.g., left-leaning or
right-leaning. We show that, under a fairly broad set of conditions,
the total share of web traffic (proportion of clicks) attracted by a
given class of news sources decreases with the number of news
sources in that class. We call this phenomenon the ‘few-get-richer’
effect. For example, if there are 20 news sources, the total number
of clicks on left-leaning sources will be larger when there are just 3
of these sources than when there are 17 of them.
Intuition suggests that popular items should be more relevant
and trustworthy than unpopular ones. Yet, extensive research indi-
cates that popularity is often not very informative about quality,
especially in settings characterized by ‘rich-get-richer’ dynamics
(sometimes called the ‘Matthew effect’) [13, 22, 25, 28], or informa-
tion cascades [3, 5]. In these settings, the randomness inherent to
the dynamics of the system implies that items that become the most
popular are not always those with the best quality. The ‘few-get-
richer’ effect adds to research on the ‘rich-get-richer’ dynamics by
showing that popularity-based rankings do not only create ‘noise’
in the ranking, but can also lead to a systematic ranking bias: when
there are two distinct classes of items, items from the smaller class
become better ranked than similar items from the larger class.
The few-get-richer effect emerges in settings characterized by
two design features. The first feature consists in the ranking of
items in terms of popularity (i.e., items with more clicks are higher
ranked). The second feature is a partition of the available items in
two (or more) distinct classes.
We make two reasonable behavioral assumptions. The first as-
sumption is users’ tendency to click on top-ranked items. The
second assumption is that users have heterogeneous preferences
for the item classes. Some users have a preference for items of a
particular class, while others have a preference for items of other
classes. Still other users are indifferent to the item class.
Returning to our news search example, suppose there are few
left-leaning and many right-leaning news sources. We assume there
are three types of users: left-leaning, right-leaning, and indifferent.
The heterogeneous preference assumption means that left-leaning
users are more likely to click on left-leaning news sources, right-
leaning users are more likely to click on right-leaning news sources,
and indifferent users click exclusively based on rank. Even if the
left-leaning news sources are unpopular, left-leaning individuals
will seek them out. Because there are few such news sources, the
clicks of these left-leaning individuals will be concentrated on a few
news sources, and these sources will tend to ‘shoot up to the top’.
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Once a news source has gotten close to the top, it will attract not
only the clicks from the left-leaning individuals, but also the clicks
of indifferent users, simply because of the rich-get-richer dynamics.
This is the few-get-richer effect.
2 RELATEDWORK
Our results contribute to the understanding of the limitations of
recommender systems [8, 10, 18, 21, 23, 24], with direct applications
to the design of fair, transparent and efficient ranking systems [4, 6,
32], as well as methods to reduce the spread of misinformation [20,
29] or uncivil behavior [9, 26].
An extensive literature on modeling (click) user behavior is
weakly related to our work [7, 15, 27, 33]. Closer to our work,
several papers have proposed models of the dynamics of interac-
tions between individual searches and ranking algorithms, e.g.,
for understanding the feedback loop between ranking system and
user queries [12], explaining the observed mitigation of search
engines’ popularity bias [16], or the competition of memes using
limited attention [31]. The paper closest to ours is [17], which also
obtains a few-get-richer effect in a model where individuals get mul-
tiple signals and where (news) items are ranked via a probabilistic
popularity-based ranking. Besides being simpler, our model works
with a discrete and deterministic ranking of the websites rather
than a continuous and probabilistic one. Among other things, this
allows for a tighter connection with the experiment of Section 5.
3 THE MODEL
We present a stylized model of a search environment where indi-
viduals use a search engine to look for information on a binary
issue. At the center of the model is the ranking algorithm, which
ranks and directs individuals to the different websites, based on the
popularity of individuals’ choices.
3.1 Model of the Search Environment
There are M items, each of which belongs to exactly one of two
classes. For example, the items can be news articles and the class
of an article can be whether the source is known to be left-leaning
or right-leaning. A different, visual, example can comprise images
about animals, some of which are cats while the others are dogs.
In general, each of the M items is characterized by a binary sig-
nal {0, 1} that defines its class; letMk denote the set and number
of items of class k , k ∈ {0, 1}.
There is a single popularity-based ranking algorithm which,
starting with a given initial ranking (r1), ranks all the items inM
according to the number of clicks received. Let rn ∈ {1, . . . ,M}M
denote the ranking seen by individual n, where rn,m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}
denotes the rank of itemm observed by individual n.
There are N individuals, each of which is characterized by a
parameter γn , which can be of one of three types. The three types
are denoted by Type 0, Type 1 and Type 2, and their proportions in
the population are p0, p1 and p2 = 1 − p0 − p1, respectively. Type 0
(resp. Type 1) individuals have a preference for clicking on items
of class 0 (resp. class 1). Type 2 individuals are indifferent between
clicking on items of class 0 or of class 1 absent ranking. We represent
the set of possible types by Γ = {Γ0, Γ1, Γ2}, where Γi denotes the
probability that an individual of Type i (i.e., with γn = Γi ) clicks
on an item of class 0 absent ranking. Our assumptions about the
preferences of the individuals in the three types imply Γ0 > 12 ,
Γ1 < 12 and Γ2 =
1
2 .
We summarize these preferences in terms of propensities φn,m
with which individual n with γn ∈ Γ clicks on itemm, defined by:
φn,m =

γn
M0 ifm ∈ M0
1−γn
M1 ifm ∈ M1.
(1)
For simplicity, in this section, we consider the extreme and sym-
metric case, where Γ0 = 1, Γ1 = 0 and p0 = p1 = p > 0.
3.2 Model of Stochastic Choices
Individuals enter one after the other and observe the ranked list
of items, and based on the ranking and on their preference for the
signals given by φn,m , they click on one of theM items according
to a probabilistic choice function obtained as follows. We use the
function β(M−rn,m) to weigh the propensitiesφn,m , whereby β > 1
calibrates an individual’s search cost or attention bias, so that an
item ranked exactly one position higher has β times as much proba-
bility of being clicked. The probability individualn clicks on website
m is given by:
ρn,m =
β(M−rn,m)φn,m∑
m′∈M β(M−rn,m′)φn,m′
. (2)
Thus, individual n observes rn,m and clicks on a website according
to ρn,m . His click gets recorded by the ranking algorithm, which
updates its ranking to rn+1. This affects the ranking of the websites
observed by the next individual, who clicks on a website according
to ρn+1,m and so on. We denote the total clicking probability on
items of class k (Mk ) by ρn,Mk =
∑
m∈Mk ρn,m .
Overall, this defines a search environment E with parameters
(M,M1); (N , β , Γ,p); r1. We assume β > 1 and 0 < p < 12 so that
individuals are subject to an attention bias and are heterogeneous
in the sense that there are nonzero shares of Types 0, 1 and 2.
3.3 The Few-Get-Richer Effect
The following result shows how few items of a given class can
attract more traffic than many more items of the same class taken
together. In particular, it implies that if there is just one item of a
given class, then it will attract more traffic by itself thanM − 1 such
items taken together in a corresponding environment where there
areM − 1 such items.
Proposition 1. Fix two popularity-based search environments E
and E ′ that differ only in the number of items of class 1 (M1 andM ′1
respectively). Suppose M1 < M1+β <
βM
1+β < M
′
1, then there exists N
such that, for any N ≥ N , the total clicking probability (ρN ,M1 ) by
individual N on an item in M1 in environment E is strictly greater
than the total clicking probability (ρN ,M ′1 ) by individual N on an
item inM ′1 in environment E ′, provided p > 0 is sufficiently small.
The proof is in three steps. First, we characterize a limit ranking
(r∞) of the process ρn defined by Eq. (2) and show it constitutes a
(stable) limit. Second, we show it is the unique such limit ranking.
Finally, we compute total traffic on all items inM1 at the limit and
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Figure 1: Total traffic on allM1 items of class 1 as a function
of M1 for the limit distribution of the process ρn of Eq. (2)
for different values of β , with M = 20, Γ = {0.8, 0.2, 0.5} and
p = p0 = p1 = 0.4.
show it is over half of total traffic when M1 < M1+β , and hence
greater than total traffic on all items inM ′1 forM
′
1 >
βM
1+β .
Step 1. ConsiderM items and a ranking r∞ ∈ {1, . . . ,M} defined
by r∞,k = k , for k = 1, . . . ,M . Then, by popularity ranking, r∞ is a
(stable) limit ranking of the process ρn if and only if at r∞:
ρn,1(r∞) > ρn,2(r∞) > . . . > ρn,M (r∞) (3)
holds for the expected individual n. Suppose r∞ is such that theM
items are ranked in two blocks of items of the same class where, if
M1 < M1+β , the first rankedM1 items are all inM1 and the remaining
ones (bottom ranked) are all inM0; and symmetrically ifM1 > βM1+β ,
the bottom rankedM1 items are all inM1 and the remaining ones
(top ranked) are all inM0. To see that these constitute limit rankings,
suppose M1 < M1+β , and consider the ranking r∞, where the first
M1 items are ranked on top. In this case, the corresponding clicking
probabilities for k ∈ M1 (i.e., k ∈ {1, . . . ,M1}) are given by:
ρn,k (r∞) =
β (M−k )(1 − γn )/M1∑M1
k=1 β
(M−k )(1 − γn )/M1 +∑Mk=M1+1 β (M−k )γn/M0 ,
and for k ∈ M0 (i.e., k ∈ {M1 + 1, . . . ,M}) satisfy:
ρn,k (r∞) =
β (M−k )γn/M0∑M1
k=1 β
(M−k )(1 − γn )/M1 +∑Mk=M1+1 β (M−k )γn/M0 .
Clearly, ρn,k (r∞) > ρn,k+1(r∞) holds within the classes M1 and
M0, that is, for k = 1, . . . ,M1 − 1 and for k = M1 + 1, . . . ,M − 1
Hence it suffices to show that ρn,k=M1 (r∞) > ρn,k=M1+1(r∞). This
is easily checked for the expected individual n (whose value of γn is
drawn from Γ = {1, 0, 12 } according to the probabilities, respectively,
p0 = p,p1 = p < 12 and p2 = 1 − 2p > 0).
Step 2: To see that the above ranking constitutes a unique limit,
we show that no other ranking satisfies Eq. (3) and that, for any
other ranking, whenever an item is in the less numerous class (say
M1 when M1 < M1+β ), it will always get strictly more clicks in
expectation than the item of the other more numerous class ranked
just above. AssumeM1 < M1+β , then it can be checked that the two
strongest constraints to be satisfied are the ones comparing the
clicking probability on the lowest-ranked item of classM1 when (i)
it is ranked in theMth position while all remainingM1 − 1 items
are ranked in the firstM1 − 1 positions, and when (ii) it is ranked
in position M1 + 2 while all remaining M1 − 1 items are ranked
in the first M1 − 1 positions. Both are easily seen to be satisfied
whenever p = 0 and M1 < M1+β . By continuity they continue to
hold for sufficiently small p > 0. The caseM1 > βM1+β , which implies
M0 < M1+β and which has the M0 items ranked on top holds by
symmetry.
Step 3. It suffices to show that whenever M1 < M1+β , then the
first ranked items inM1 always get strictly more that half the share
of the total clicks. Since the share of traffic on the individual items
is given by the probabilities ρn,k (r∞) defined above, it suffices to
show that for any M1 < M1+β , ρn,M1 (r∞) =
∑M1
k=1 ρn,k (r∞) > 12 .
Given our assumptions on p and Γ, this is easily checked for the
expected individual n (using the fact that, for any 1 ≤ K < K ′ ≤
M ,
∑K
k=1 β
M−K /K > ∑K ′k=1 βM−K ′/K ′). It also implies that when
M ′1 >
βM
1+β all items inM
′
1 will (be bottom-ranked) and will obtain
less than half the total traffic. □
When the share of items inM1 is close to one half ( M1+β < M1 <
M
2 ), then there may be multiple limit rankings and the above proof
no longer applies. We believe that the few-get-richer result may
still go through in these cases, but it is necessary to evaluate the
likelihood of the different limit rankings and guarantee that limit
rankings are more likely to give classes with fewer items a higher
probability of being higher ranked. This proof goes beyond the
scope of this paper.
Similarly, for interior types (Γ0 < 1, Γ1 > 0). As Figure 1 shows
for different values of β (see also the simulations in the next section),
the effect continues to hold: whenM1 has few items (minority case
M1 < M1+β ) it obtains a larger proportion of clicks than when M1
has many items (majority caseM1 > βM1+β ).
4 SIMULATIONS OF THE MODEL
We now analyze through simulations the presence of the few-get-
richer effect in different settings. Our focus is on analyzing the click-
through rate (CTR), defined as the the ratio of the probability of
clicking on an item inM1 to the total number of clicks N (which we
fix at N = 100 users), as a function ofM1 for different settings. We
mainly consider stochastic choices with Γ = {0.9, 0.1, 0.5}, which
means that non-indifferent users do not exclusively click on one of
the two classes. We assume that the ranking rn is proportional to
the number of clicks that the item received at time n. As before, we
consider a ranking ofM = 20 items with theM1 items initially at the
bottom. In this case, instead of the limit ranking, we characterize the
dynamic transient during which the minority class may reach the
top of the ranking. This makes our analysis dependent on the initial
conditions. For an itemm initially at position r1,m , we assume a
uniform initialization, with all items having one click.
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Figure 2: Proportion of clicks on all M1 items of class 1 as a function of M1 for runs of N = 100, and assuming M = 20,
β = 1.1, Γ = {0.9, 0.1, 0.5},p0 = p1 = 0.4 and uniform initialization, as baseline, and varying β (left plot), p2 = 1 − p0 − p1 (middle
plot), and the log-ratio log p0p1 (right plot). Error bars indicate confidence intervals for 100 different random realizations.
4.1 Dependence on β
Wefirst consider the dependence on the ranking effect, parametrized
by β . Larger values of β correspond to a stronger relative ranking
effect compared to the propensities. Here, we consider a symmetric
case with p0 = p1 = p = 0.4.
Figure 2 (left) shows the CTR for different values of β . The re-
sulting CTR is almost symmetric. We observe a monotonic decrease
as a function of M1 in all cases, showing, in particular, that the
minority class always receives more clicks than the majority one.
We can differentiate between three cases, corresponding to small,
intermediate and large values of β , respectively. In general, larger
values of β lead to a relatively larger CTR for the minority class, due
to relatively larger probability of clicking on top ranked items. For
small values of β , the CTR is the smallest, but even here the effect
as a function ofM1 is particularly pronounced for small (and large)
M1. For intermediate values of β , the flat region for intermediate
values ofM1 disappears and the CTR decreases monotonically with
constant slope, indicating a decrease independent of M1. Finally,
for larger values of β , the CTR is largest, and the effect as a function
of M1 is smallest for small (and large) M1. In this extreme case,
forM1 = 1, the single item at the bottom quickly reaches the top
and attracts almost all the traffic, leaving almost no traffic to the
remainingM − 1 items of the other class.
From these simulations, we can conclude that the few-get-richer
effect is robust to varying β .
4.2 Dependence on p2
We now analyze the CTR as a function of the proportion of indif-
ferent users p2 = 1 − p0 − p1. For this, we choose β = 1.1 and vary
the proportion of indifferent users while keeping p0 = p1. To better
analyze this dependence, we consider extreme preferences, so that
only indifferent users can really click on both items, that is, we
assume Γ = {1, 0, 0.5}.
Figure 2(middle) shows the results. We observe that, in this case,
the few-get-richer effect is more pronounced asp2 increases. Having
a larger proportion of indifferent users results in relatively more
clicks per item, and hence a larger amplification of ranking effect,
which is a key ingredient for the few-get-richer effect to emerge.
With less extreme preferences, e.g., Γ = {0.9, 0.1, 0.5}, the effect in
p2 is still present, but less pronounced (data not shown).
We conclude that the indifferent users play a key role in am-
plifying the effect of the ranking, and that in general, having a
larger proportion of them contributes importantly towards the
few-get-richer effect.
4.3 Dependence on the ratio p0p1
So far we have considered cases where the distribution of user types
was symmetric, p0 = p1 = p. In practice this need not be the case
since, e.g., the minority class might also be preferred by a minority
of users. We analyze the effect as a function of lr = log p0p1 .
Figure 2(right) shows the results for different values of lr . As
expected, the few-get-richer effect is more pronounced when there
is a larger relative proportion of users that prefer the minority item.
To see this, compare the blue line, where p1 = 0.6 > p0 = 0.2 (there
are three times more users who prefer the ‘minority’ item), and
the purple line, where p1 = 0.1 < p0 = 0.7. We see that the effect
is still present for this choice of parameters, even when there are
seven times more users who prefer the majority item. Here, the
proportion of indifferent users is set to p2 = 0.2. Consistent with
the results of the previous subsection, if we increase p2 and keep
the same ratios, the effect becomes more pronounced. We conclude
that the effect is also robust to different ratios of proportions lr .
4.4 Ranking evolution
Finally, we illustrate the typical behavior of the ranking evolution
for different values ofM1, assuming our usual baseline parameter
values for β , Γ, and p and uniform initialization. Figure 3 shows the
results, which confirm the idea that minority items tend to move
towards the top.
5 ONLINE EXPERIMENTWITH HUMAN
PARTICIPANTS
To test the predictions of the model, we executed an online ex-
periment in which participants clicked on one out of 20 possible
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Figure 3: Examples of ranking evolution for different values ofM1. The items inM1 always start at the bottom of the ranking.
With M1 = 2 (left plot), the two items quickly move to the top. With M1 = 9 (middle plot), the items in M1 are spread through
the different ranking positions. Finally, withM1 = 18 (orM0 = 2) (right plot), the itemsM1 eventually stay at the bottom.
options (pictures).1 The options belonged to two classes, M0 and
M1, just as in the model. As in the simulations reported above, we
measure the effect of the popularity-based ranking of options as the
total number of clicks attracted by items of type M1. To this end,
we created 8 independent conditions. In conditions D1 to D4, the
ordering of the options changed dynamically as a function of the
number of clicks received by each option, with the most popular
option (in terms of cumulative number of clicks) at the top of the
screen and the least popular option at the bottom of the screen. The
conditions differed in terms of the number of options in M0 and
M1, as summarized in Table 1. The number of options in M1 was
17, 12, 8, or 3 in conditions D1, D2, D3 and D4, respectively.
These four ‘dynamic’ conditions were matched to four ‘static’
conditions with the same sets of optionsM0 andM1. In the static
conditions, the ranking of options did not change over time and
was set to the initial ranking in the matching dynamic condition.
We denote these static conditions by S1, S2, S3, and S4.
Comparisons of matched pairs of conditions allows us to estab-
lish the causal effect of the ranking algorithm on the total traffic
attracted by each option. Comparisons of the 4 dynamic conditions
allows us to test the prediction that the total traffic attracted by
options inM1 decreases with the number of options inM1.
To keep the experimental setup as simple as possible, the options
in our experiment were not news sources, but pictures of dogs and
cats. In order to activate their preferences for cat or dog pictures,
participants were first asked whether they were a ‘cat person’, a
‘dog person’, or ‘neither a cat person nor a dog person.’ Answers
to this identity question allowed us to compute the proportion of
participants in each of the 3 types discussed in the model section.
Then participants were shown a set of 20 pictures in a vertical list.
In this setup,M0 is the set of cat pictures (initially at the top of the
screen) and M1 is the set of dog pictures (initially at the bottom).
The initial popularity of all pictures was set to 1, consistent with
the uniform initialization of the previous section.
5.1 Methodological Details
We recruited 786 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk. It was
administered via a Qualtrics survey embedded in the Amazon Me-
chanical Turk webpage as an iframe. After signing up for the task,
1Data from the experiment are available at https://osf.io/nwjyf/.
participants read the informed-consent form. Then they were ran-
domly assigned to one of 8 conditions. They first answered a ques-
tion about their type: “Are youmore of a cat person or a dog person?”
with three possible choices “I am a cat person” / “I am neither a cat
person nor a dog person” / “I am a dog person.” On the next screen
they were shown 20 buttons with “Please click on a photo from the
following list of photos of cats and dogs and rate it according to your
liking.” The buttons were displayed in a vertical list. Participants
could initially see 3 to 4 buttons and had to scroll down to access
the other buttons. After clicking a button, participants were shown
the corresponding picture and gave it a rating of 1 to 5 stars. The
rating task was presented as a reason to ask participants to select
an item according to their preferences. The collected ratings are
not discussed because our interest is only in the clicking behavior
of the participant. Participants were paid $0.15 for their time.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Participant Types. 30% indicated they were ‘Cat persons’
(p0 = 0.30), 55% ‘Dog persons’ (p1 = 0.55), 15% neither (p2 = 0.15).
5.2.2 Total Traffic Attracted by M1 (Dog pictures). Dog pictures
were initially ranked at the bottom the screen. First we discuss the
effect of popularity-based ranking of options on the total traffic
attracted by Dog pictures. In the 4 dynamic conditions, Dog pic-
tures attracted substantially more traffic than in the corresponding
static condition (compare the two rows ‘Experiment’ in the top and
bottom panels of Table 1). In other words, ordering the options in
terms of popularity had a systematic effect on the share of traffic
attracted by options that started at the bottom of the choice screen.
Unsurprisingly, in all static conditions, the total traffic attracted
by Dog pictures was lower than 50%. The set of Dog pictures at-
tracted more traffic when there were relatively more Dog pictures.
For example, while 17 Dog pictures attracted 44% of the traffic, 3
Dog pictures attracted 27%.
The pattern is completely different in the dynamic conditions.
First, in all dynamic conditions, the total traffic attracted by Dog
pictures was higher than 50%. The most important finding is that
the total traffic attracted by Dog pictures was larger with just 3 Dog
pictures (and 17 Cat pictures) than with 17 Dog pictures (and 3 Cat
pictures)! Similarly, the total traffic attracted by Dog pictures was
larger with 8 Dog pictures (and 12 Cat pictures) than with 12 Dog
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Table 1: Experiment results. The ‘Sim1’ rows report the av-
erage traffic attracted by Dog pictures (M1) over 1000 simula-
tions of the choice model with a setting matching the exact
number of participants of each identity type in each condi-
tion. The ‘Sim2’ rows report the average traffic attracted by
Dog pictures (M1) over 1000 simulations of the choice model
with 100 users in each conditionwhere the numbers of users
who are a ‘dog person’, ‘neither a dog person nor a cat per-
son’ and a ‘cat person’ are 55, 15 and 30, respectively (same
frequencies for all conditions).
# Cats (M0) 3 8 12 17
# Dogs (M1) 17 12 8 3
Dynamic Button Ordering
Condition D1 D2 D3 D4
# participants 96 102 99 101
# participants Cat person 34 30 24 29
in each Neither 9 21 11 16
type Dog person 53 51 64 56
Dog Experiment .53 .69 .76 .71
traffic Sim1 .46 .56 .73 .76
share Sim2 .47 .60 .67 .75
Static Button Ordering
Condition S1 S2 S3 S4
# participants 96 101 95 96
# participants Cat person 34 30 25 33
in each Neither 13 19 9 15
type Dog person 49 52 61 48
Dog Experiment .44 .37 .40 .27
traffic Sim1 .41 .37 .39 .28
share Sim2 .44 .39 .35 .30
pictures (and 8 Cat pictures). These results are consistent with the
predictions of our model. The total traffic attracted by Dog pictures
did not decrease monotonically with the size of the set of Dog
pictures (it is larger with 8 Dog pictures than with 3 Dog pictures).
This pattern is seemingly inconsistent with the predictions of the
simulations (Fig. 2). Yet, this lack of monotonicity can be explained
by the fact that the conditions were not perfectly balanced with
respect to the distribution of identity types of the participants.
In condition D3 (8 Dog pictures) there were substantially more
Dog lovers (64/99) than in condition D4 (3 Dog pictures, 56/101).
This is a chance event resulting from the fact that we elicited the
identity type of the participants after the random assignment into
conditions, thus we could not balance types within conditions.
5.2.3 Estimated Parameters of the Choice Model. We estimated the
parameters of the stochastic choice model, Eq. (2), using maximum
likelihood on the whole dataset. Our parameter estimates are β =
1.22, ΓC = .74 for Cat persons (Γ0 in the model), and ΓD = .08 for
Dog persons (Γ1 in the model). Cat and Dog persons had strong
tendencies to choose pictures from the class consistent with their
identity type.
We used these estimated parameters to simulate choices and
the dynamics of picture ranks in the 8 experimental conditions.
Simulations reported in rows ‘Sim1’ in Table 1 indicate a close
match between the simulated data and the actual traffic proportions
attracted by Dog pictures (both in static and dynamics conditions).
We also used the estimated parameters to simulate what would
happen if there were 100 participants in each condition and if
the distributions of identity types were the same in all conditions
(‘Sim2’ rows). We find a decreasing monotonous relation between
the number of Dog pictures and the share of traffic attracted by Dog
pictures. This pattern is consistent with the qualitative prediction
of our model.
5.2.4 Summary. Overall, the results indicate that the experimental
setting falls within the boundary condition of application of our
theory. They provide a proof-of-concept that popularity-based or-
dering of options can lead to the counter-intuitive phenomenon
that when there are fewer options of one class, the total share of
traffic attracted by this class of options becomes larger.
6 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
The few-get-richer effect can have both positive and negative effects
on the quality of the information people obtain from search results.
On the positive side, when there are few relevant items, the few-get-
richer effect may help them become top-ranked, making them more
accessible. At the same time, the few-get-richer effect can contribute
to the spread of misinformation. It may help few irrelevant or
‘fake news’ items become top-ranked, especially if there is a strong
preference for such items and only few websites report them.
Our analyses highlight a potential unintended effect of regula-
tions that ‘ban’ particular ‘alternative’ news sources known for
spreading ‘fake news’. When a sizeable proportion of users have a
preference for identifiable ‘alternative’ news sources, the removal
of some of these news sources might lead to an increase in the total
traffic attracted by the remaining ‘alternative’ news sources. This
could result in more overall exposure to ‘fake news’!
To neutralize the few-get-richer effect, our theory suggests that it
may be advisable to keep track of the number of items in each class
when incorporating clicks in the search engine algorithm. Ideally,
the ranking algorithm should use the popularity of the different
items in a way that is neutral to the number of items in each class.
The few-get-richer effect also has implications for the design
of recommender systems. The learning efficiency of these systems
is impeded by the presentation bias problem: items shown to the
user can get clicks whereas items not shown get no clicks. The
recommender system thus cannot learn about the relevance of the
latter items. A popular solution to this challenge is the explore-
and-exploit approach, in which some items from a minority class
are randomly inserted in the search results [1]. This purportedly
increases the amount of exploration (clicks on the minority class),
and thus increases the learning opportunities of the system at
the cost of slightly hurting the user experience [18, 23]. The few-
get-richer effect suggests precisely the opposite. Adding more of
those items might reduce, rather than increase, the total amount of
exploration.
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